Fazekas, Mihaly; Poltoratskaya, Viktoriia; Marc Tobias Schiffbauer; Tóth, Bence. Procuring Low Growth : The Impact of Political Favoritism on Public Procurement and Firm Performance in Bulgaria (English). Policy Research Working Paper WPS11085; Prosperity Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group.
This paper assesses the impact of favoritism in public procurement on private sector productivity growth. To this end, it combines three novel microeconomic data sets: administrative data on firms, including more than 4 million firm-year observations and rich financial and ownership information; public procurement transaction data for 150,000 published contracts and their tenders; and a newly assembled data set on firms’ political connections, drawing on asset declarations, sanction lists, and offshore leaks. This comprehensive data set allows tracing the impact of favoritism in allocating government contracts to economic growth. The findings show that politically connected firms are 18 to 32 percent more likely to win public procurement contracts due to their preferential access to uncompetitive tenders. Public procurement results in higher subsequent productivity and employment growth only if it has been awarded through competitive tenders. Firms winning contracts through uncompetitive procedures have flat growth but higher profit margins. Consistent with these findings, the paper shows that firms that are awarded uncompetitive public procurement contracts obtain rents of 9 to 11 percent from overpaid contracts. The results suggest that aggregate annual total factor productivity growth would have been 8 percent higher in the absence of favoritism in public procurement.
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